Autocratic Cooperation and Threat Perceptions in US Foreign Policy

Autocratic countries have formed and joined international organizations (IOs) for the last century. Yet despite their historical prominence in the international system, they rarely garner notice from great powers. Why do US policymakers only occasionally view autocratic IOs as a threat to US foreign policy? We argue that the focus of US foreign policy is dynamic, rather than static. All IOs fluctuate in their vitality; as such US policymakers pay less attention to stable features of autocratic IOs, such as the presence of a major rival or to their mandate. Instead, autocratic IOs appear as a threat only when they can effectively coordinate. We test this argument using text-as-data methods to analyze declassified State Department cables from 1973-1979. Only a handful “autocratic IOs” attracted State’s notice, and we demonstrate that moments of coordination within autocratic IOs generate both a higher volume of communications, and more alarmist language.

Recommended citation: Julia Gray, Raymond Hicks, and Matthew Connelly. 2024. "Autocratic Cooperation and Threat Perceptions in US Foreign Policy"